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Summary findings
In any economic  environment  where decisions  are  affects  resource  allocation  and pricing  decisions  from
decentralized,  agents  consider  the risk  that others might  rational, forward-looking  agents.
unfairly  exploit  informational  asymmetries  to their own  His analysis  leads  to core propositions  about the role
disadvantage.  of finance  and financial  efficiency  in economic
Incomplete  trust, especially,  lies at the heart of  development.
financial  transactions  in which  agents  trade current real  He recommends  areas  of financial  sector reform  in
claims  for promises  of future real  claims.  Agents  thus  emerging  economies  aimed  at improving  the financial
need to invest  considerable  resources  to assess  the  system's  efficiency  in dealing with  incomplete  trust.
trustworthiness  of others with  whom they know they can  Among  other things,  the public  sector can improve  trust
interact only  under conditions  of limited  and  in finance  by improving  financial  infrastructure,
asymmetrically  distributed  information.  including  legal  systems,  financial  regulation,  and security
Thinking  of finance  as the complex  of institutions  and  in payment  and trading systems.
instruments  needed  to reduce the cost of trading  But fundamental  improvements  in financial  efficiency
promises  among  anonymous  individuals  who do not fully  may best  be gained  by eliciting  good conduct through
trust each  other, Bossone  analyzes  how incomplete  trust  market  forces.
shapes  the transaction  costs  in trading assets,  and how it
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Part I. Finance, information, and trust
1.1  Asymmetric information and incomplete trust
Although the importance of information imperfections in economic analysis had been early
recognized by some scholars (Arrow, 1953; Stigler, 1961; Brunner and Meltzer, 1971; Alchiana
and Demsetz, 1972), it was only after research started systematically to look at the implications of
the asymmetric distribution of information across the agents, well into the eighties, that
information has become central to the study of finance. The essence of the Asymmetric
Information (AI) research program in finance is captured by Greenwald and Stiglitz' (1987)
emphasis on  ". ..the need for a more radical departure from the neoclassical framework, and for a
much deeper study of the consequences of imperfections in capital markets, imperfections which
can be explained by the costs of information" (p. 123).
Al characterizes a situation where one side of the market has better information than the
other on options and incentives, and the less informed side is aware of its informational
disadvantage. AI in financial markets creates inefficiencies because the incentives problems due
to adverse selection and moral hazard of fund-users diminish the net returns to financial investors.
Such incentive problems reduce the opportunity for risk sharing in capital markets and may give
rise to fund-rationing as financial investors choose to turn away observationally equivalent
borrowers at a fixed rate of interest, or discriminate among borrowers with respect to the terms of
the financial agreements.
By challenging the assumption of perfect and costless information, Al theory has derived
important implications for understanding rational behavior under risk, also shedding light on the
principal-agent problems underpinning a large variety of real-world agent interactions. In
particular, AI theory has laid the ground for a micro-economically founded interpretation of the
role of financial intermediaries (especially banks) as reducing risks on financial investment
through information processing, and has laid out fundamental principles for designing appropriate
incentives to limit the inefficiencies from information asymmetries.
2Yet, the existence of information asymmetries is only part of the more general problem of
uncertainty confronting rational choices in a world with time. Post Keynesians radically criticize
AI (New Keynesian) theorists for eluding the question of how agents form their decisions in the
absence of risk mapping information, by assuming a (typically neoclassical) ergodic world where
well-defined and known probability distributions of future contingencies replace Keynesian
(fundamental) uncertainty with manageable risk! Moreover, Post Keynesians deny that the
implications of AI theory say anything on economic cycles and crises that is not already
embodied in Keynes' liquidity-preference theory.
Recognizing that information is intrinsically limited and asymmetric, and that
diversification and specialization of activity require agents to rely on the services of others, this
study looks at the implications for intertemporal resource allocation and asset prices of that
particular form of uncertainty deriving from lack of full trust - or incomplete trust  - among
agents. Incomplete trust can be defined as the agents' awareness that others may seek to  pursue
inappropriate gains either through deliberately reneging on obligations due on earlier
commitments, or by hiding information relevant to transactions. More in general, and considering
that agents operate under uncertainty, the concept of trust may involve the agent 's  judgement that
her counterparty to a contract would make all reasonable efforts to deliver on the contract. 3
Incomplete trust lies at the core of Al. Whereas, in principle, full trustworthy agents can
trade at zero (or low) cost, in spite of Al, since each can (risklessly) take everybody else's word at
face value, symmetric information is not possible without assuming full trust: full informational
symmetry holds only if individuals always reveal their true inner motives, that is, if they are fully
trustworthy.
As the risk of unfair exploitation of asymmetries grows real, what becomes important to
the agents is to be able to benefit from asymmetric information while managing their mutual trust
gaps. More information is searched by the agents not so much to reduce information asymmetries,
as to see whether and how they can trust each other, some agents specialize in bridging these
gaps, and institutions evolve to reduce the effects of distrust by improving incentives to honest or
fully informative behavior and contractual performance. Resources invested in activities aimed to
reduce the inefficiency costs from incomplete trust affect transactions and the price of
commodities and assets exchanged among the assets
The problem of incomplete trust is particularly crucial in financial transactions, where
anonymous agents trade current real resource claims in exchange for promises to receive back
real resource claims at some given point in future. Traders of promises need to ascertain whether
their counterparties do their best to keep to their promises, and whether they are able to use
information efficiently to this end.
3In small communities of societies in early stages of economic development, with strong
ties among members, financial transactions even with long-term obligations can take place at
reasonable costs. 4 In contrast, in larger and more complex communities, where interpersonal
bonds are weakened by agent anonymity and information asymmetries are embedded in largely
decentralized-decisions contexts, financial transactions can be undertaken only if institutions
specialize in activities to limit the costs of incomplete trust and if they are supported by
appropriate infrastructure.
Specializing means investing in information to select trustworthy and efficient fund-users,
monitoring their behavior, adopting incentives to elicit honest behavior, thus creating a
reputation of their own for being good bridges of trust between anonymous agents. 5 Anonymous
financial-service users, on their part, invest more to identify reliable and efficient bridges of trust
with other agents, so as to reduce the costs from AI separating them.
The role of specialized institutions is complemented by infrastructural components (e.g.,
legal system, regulation and supervision, trading technologies, incentives and enforcement
mechanisms) aimed to strengthen commitment compliance from individual agents.
This study analyzes how incomplete trust shapes transaction costs and - hence - asset
allocation, and how the financial system and public policy respond to the problem of incormplete
trust. The study is structured in two parts. In part I, section 1.2  discusses the role of money and
financial assets under incomplete trust, develops a model to determine the impact of financial
efficiency on intertemporal resource allocation, asset prices and capital accumulation, and draws
implications for the relationship between finance and economic development. Part II focuses on
policy issues: sections 11.  I and 11.2  discuss how financial intermediaries can enhance trust by
accumulating reputational capital, and section 11.3  identifies policies to improve the efficiency of
the financial system in dealing with incomplete trust.
1.2  Information  and trust  in intertemporal  resource  allocation  and pricing
In a world where transactions were carried out simultaneously, money would be redundant.
Money becomes necessary as a store of value and a transaction device only when time is
introduced in the exchange process and the simultaneity assumption is dropped.
The link between time and money rests on a twofold argument. The first - following the
Keynesian-Hicksian tradition - relates to uncertainty and market incompleteness: to the extent
that transactions are effected sequentially, the future is uncertain, and markets do not exist for all
possible contingencies, the agents hold reserves of purchasing power stored in instruments that
can easily be exchanged for real commodities as needs arise.
4The generally accepted analytical implication of the uncertainty argument is that under the
assumption of complete markets (as in a typical Arrow-Debreu setting), and notwithstanding the
existence of time, money becomes as irrelevant as in timeless models. Gale (1978) has proved
this argument flawed by showing that, even with complete markets, money serves as a store of
value if the agents do not trust each other in their commitment to fulfill their contract terms 7
Incomplete trust  is thus the second reason for tying money to time. 8 Even if all agents had
perfect forecast capability of future contingencies, their anticipation that others might renege on
obligations, or cheat on the quality of whatever they supply, would by itself create the need to
adopt some means that can store value over time and be equally acceptable to all agents in the
exchange process. Such means must be easily recognizable by all participants, so that its
information content is visible to all at a low cost.9  This requirement would not be necessary in a
world of fully trustworthy individuals, even if information were distributed symmetrically among
them, as each would be taken at her own word as to the value of whatever she supplies in the
exchange process. Of course, individuals' uncertainty of the future would still make them hold
stores of value for precautionary reasons, or give them incentives to hold assets for speculative
purposes.
Under incomplete trust, information is necessary for the agents to assess their mutual
trustworthiness as well as the quality of the assets submitted to trade.1 0 In such a case, assets
differ from one another as to their power to convey information on their quality and the
trustworthiness of their suppliers: some assets are relatively more costly than others for use in the
exchange and payment process, since their acceptability requires more information and involves
longer search activity than others. In a competitive equilibrium setting, the asset return structure
should thus reflect the transaction costs underlying each asset's trading, ultimately associated
with the quality of the assets and the trustworthiness of those for whom they represent a
liability." On their side, asset holders should hold more of an asset up to where its return equals
its marginal utility net of what is lost due to the (asset-specific) transaction costs. In fact, one way
to look at the financial system in a decentralized-decisions context is to consider its role to reduce
the transaction costs associated with incomplete trust.
1.2.1 A model of incomplete trust in asset trading
The model used in this study is an integrated version of Bossone's (1997). As in the former
version, the core of the model consists of deriving a general form of optimal demand functions
for assets trading in a multi-sector economy, under incomplete trust and uncertainty. In the
following, the first step will be to define the rationale for, and the mechanism of, asset price
discounting in an incomplete trust context. As a second step, the utility content of money and
5financial assets will be formalized. An optimal intertemporal decision framework under general
equilibrium will then be used to study the effects of financial system innovations and output
variability on resource allocation and pricing.
Asset price discounting
Assume an asset Q - say, a financial security - earning a nominal interest rate r Q.12  With
incomplete trust, asset Q may be purchased (sold) at market price pQ (= 1  / rQ) plus (minus) a
unit premium (discount) specific to the asset, d Q. To formalize the discount factor d Q, define
first the asset trading context under incomplete trust.
An holder of Q who wishes to realize the asset advertises its sale on the market and submits
an ask-price for it." 3 If the holder is fully trusted by all other agents, no prior assessment is
necessary from potential buyers and the transaction costs involved are smaller than under
incomplete trust since Q is equally acceptable to all agents and against all other assets. With
incomplete trust, on the other hand, sellers need to undertake longer and costlier processes for
achieving best price sales as: i) different agents submit different bid-prices for the same asset due
to their different perceptions of asset quality, and ii) not all agents stand ready to buy assets on
sale due to the assets' limited acceptability in trade. Also, iii) higher costs are incurred by the
agents to assess their mutual trustworthiness as well as the quality of the asset traded. Lastly, iv)
assets with different characteristics bear different information costs.
Under incomplete trust, one may assume that the shorter the time available to the holder for
realizing the asset, and the lower the asset's acceptability in trade, the larger is the cost that the
holder must be willing to bear in order to raise the needed liquidity. Such a cost takes the form of
a discount on the asset market price that the seller offers to potential buyers. The rationale for
price discounting rests on two factors: a) risk-averse agents are reluctant to trade assets whose
true value they know with certainty against assets with uncertain or unknown value to them; b)
even if some agents possess sure knowledge of the true value of the asset, they consider that
others might not share the same knowledge thereby introducing frictions in the indirect exchange
of the asset.
The time factor plays here a crucial role: with incomplete trust and a given financial
structure (as characterized by institutional and legal arrangements, range and quality of
intermediaries, and transaction technologies), each asset is characterized by its own optimal
transaction time. This is the minimum time required of the asset-holder to maximize the net
proceeds from the asset sale, including as such the time it takes the buyer to assess the
6trustworthiness of the seller, the quality of the asset, the asset's acceptability in indirect exchange,
as well as the time necessary to complete the transaction. 14
Operationally, the optimal transaction time can be defined as the interval necessary for the
seller to realize the asset at its current market value. The proceeds from optimal asset sale equal
such a price net of the minimum asset-specific (unit) transaction cost d Q*,  involved in
completing the sale in the given trading context. Thus, suboptimal sales that take place at
discounts on the asset market price greater than the minimum transaction cost, and occur when
the asset must be realized within a time span shorter than its optimal transaction time. Discount
factor dQ 2 dQ*  can thus be formalized as a function of:
1.  the optimal transaction time interval, At*: the longer the latter, the larger the discount at
which Q must trade to shorten the sale time; and
2.  the time interval, At  , available to Q's holder to realize the asset: for At"  < At;,  the shorter
the former vis-a-vis the latter, the larger the discount at which Q sells.
Expectations of higher output variability affect the price discount factor by shortening AtQ  .
Thus,
(1)  dQ = dQ  (1- AtP(  I  wt) /  iAt  ())
where (,  I  wI) =,E[, 8 Jatwj  I  w  reflects  the agent's expected  (time weighted)  average
variability of consumption from date t onward, conditional on signalw,. The conditional relation
of (o  on w is such that the forner  increases as w approaches one. Signalw e (0,1) varies
directly with the uncertainty perceived by the agents in the economy (see Appendix IV).TN  e R +
indicates the level of efficiency of the underlying financial system, defined in this context to
reflect the financial system's capacity to reduce transaction costs related to incomplete trust
through institutions and infrastructure (e.g., markets, technologies, regulations, and enforcement
mechanisms) for the intermediation of financial resources. For our purposes, function (1) can be
simplified as
(Ila)  d,Q  = dQ  (a-  I  w,, Y)  d'  e  > 0 d'T < 0
The effect of the financial efficiency indicator is such that, other conditions being equal,
price discount factors for the same assets are larger in less efficient financial systems, that is,
assets' optimal transaction times are longer under lesser financial efficiency. As a result, all extra
discounts with respect to d Q on suboptimal sales would be larger. Note that for each Q, the
7variable and state-contingent price discount would be determined according to the following
conditions:
0￿d  < I
d=  d*  if  Ato  > At*
d-->  I  if  At0/At  * -O0
Also, it is assumed that d=d = 0 if At*  0, that is, perfectly liquid assets trade at zero discount.
In the extreme, where no financial system existed andT  approached zero, trading most assets
would present no economic convenience. On the other hand, financial technological and
institutional development (i.e., a higher T  ) increases safety and speed of asset trading  - and
hence the degree of trust that agents place in asset trading - and reduces asset optimal transaction
times. Note, thus, that the concept offinancial  efficiency as here defined involves that of safe
trading as well.
Asset utility
In this model, money and financial assets are vehicles used for transferring consumption
decisions across time, to the point where future (contingent) consumption yields the highest
expected marginal utility. They transfer such decision at different speed, or transaction costs. The
structure of such costs is, as discussed above, asset specific, while their scale is determined by the
overall efficiency of the financial system.
Assets produce utility  in terms of their power to make consumption accessible to their
holders when and as needed. Utility varies positively with the consumption accessible though the
asset, and negatively with the cost of liquidating the asset. If an agent holds an asset for a period
during which she might incur income shocks, she could use that asset as an option to be exercised
at any point of the period to avert (or limit) consumption losses. To estimate the option's current
value, the agent needs to conjecture the probability of having to exercise the option (i.e., realize
the asset) at each future date of the holding period and at a given cost. Such probability depends
on the agent's knowledge of the distribution of future possible shocks, and on her use of current
information to anticipate future shocks.
The probability is defined as follows. Consider a discrete and infinite time horizon [0,oo),
and call sr e S c  R,  c  R +  the date-event whereby at any instant prior to r the agent expects a
consumption shock to be received at -r and mobilizes her resource endowments (that could
otherwise be invested) to support consumption. Let s-C  be the complement of s' in S, and let
8Wt E (0,1), Vt < r,  be an appropriate transformation of current information w', E Q,  (see
Appendix IV) where Q,  is the information set available to the agent at t. Finally, consider space
={~pr(sc =s'w,>w,),O  <  pr()  < 1 and  pr(sc  =s'>tw,  )  + pr(sc  =s-  I w,)=1},  wherein  at
every date t each agent attaches a probability of occurrence to future date-events s' 1 's,
conditional on signal w, . The signal is such that the probability of occurrence of date-event s'
increases as w, approaches one, that is, lim[pr(sc  = SC I  w)  =  1] = 1.  As clarified in Appendix
W, --*1
IV, w, approaches one as uncertainty in the economy is perceived to increase.
The marginal utility of Q at t, conditional upon current information, can thus be constructed
as the present value of the marginal utility from the stream of future contingent consumption
accessible through the asset, net of the marginal utility lost to price discounts from asset
liquidation:
(2)  u'(Q,)  = u'(Q,  I w,)
=  ,  {[1-drQ(oJrlwr,T)]  1E[u'(PtQQ,IpcrlIRQ]pr(sc=s4lwt)l/pr()}
r=tr
where:
the time subscript S  =  r - t is used for the compound interest factor
PQQ, /I  pc  is the consumption attainable atr with Q-holdings valued at their t-dated price (note
that expected future changes in the price of Q  are incorporated in Q's return);
p c  is the price of (composite) consumption commodity C
R = I + rQ - zT  is the gross real rate of return on asset Q and ;f is inflation.
Note that d Q = 0 for perfectly liquid assets, and that for given values of Q, r Q, pc,  and ,B,
different combinations of d Q and  pr ()  yield different values of u'(Q) (see Appendix III).
Operationally, relation (2) could be said to represent the expectation of the liquidity services
provided by the asset to its holder during its holding period and contingent upon future states of
nature. Note also that innovations in financial efficiency increase the marginal utility of Q  by
reducing its discount factor. Finally, an increase in w reduces Q's marginal utility by increasing both
the probability and the size of suboptimal sales (which increases Q's discount factor).
91.2.2 Asset allocation and prices under incomplete trust
To determine  the individual  resource  allocation  choices  when (trust-related)  transaction
costs are incorporated  into the agents'  decision-making  process,  assume  an economy  with  three
sectors  -households,  government  and firms -, one composite  commodity  C for consumption
expressed  in real terms,  and three assets  expressed  in nominal  terms:  monetary  asset L,
government  bond  B, and corporate  financial  security  A.
Firms  are owned  by the households.  Firms  use capital  K to produce  nominal  output y° ,16
Firms  sell output  at pricepC  and turn their income  to households  (yh). Households  also receive
government  income  transfer  g and pay out lump-sum  taxes t to the government.  The government
finances  income  transfers  via taxation  and bond issues  to the households.
Households  have well-behaved  utility  functions  with regular  shape  throughout  their
domain,  i.e., with u'(  )>O  and u"(  *  )<O  yielding  positive  risk aversion,  and with u"'( )>O
ensuring  that changes  in the variance  of consumption  affect the agent's expected  marginal  utility.
Asset  L is a non-interest  bearing  instrument  issued  by the government  and accepted  by all
the agents  as a means  of exchange  in force  of a government  legal  restriction;  thus, it trades  at zero
transaction  costs.  In every  period,  the households  enter the goods  market  with a predetermined
amount  of L.
Bond  B is a default-free  (govenmment-guaranteed)  debt  instrument,  earning  nominal  interest
rB and issued  by the government.  Its supply  Bo = g - t + rB0 + B° 0 is determined  as the state
sector  borrowing  needed  to finance  the current  fiscal  deficit  and the interest  expenditure  on
outstanding  bonds.  Bond  B trades  at market  pricepB  and may  be used by the  households  either as
for storing  value  or in indirect  exchange  at a discount  since,  unlike  L, it is not covered  by a legal
restriction  on circulation  as a means  payment.  1
7In light of the government  guarantee,  however,
such discount  is small  and supposed  to be constant  over time and across states  of nature.
Asset  A is a (risky)  corporate  bond  issued  by firms to finance  capital  acquisition.  Its supply
A  0 is placed  with the households  and is determined  at the point  where  the marginal  efficiency  of
technology  equals  the marginal  cost of funds.  Asset  A is exchanged  in the financial  market  at
price pA  and earns  nominal  interest  rA(=  I /IpA)  It is used as a store of value  and it can (in
principle)  be used also as a medium  of exchange,  although  its indirect  trade  takes  place at a
discount  much larger  than  B's due to the  absence  of guarantees  on its quality  and of legal
restrictions  on its use.
In the exchange  process,  at each date,  the infinitely-lived  h-th household  (h=l,...,B) uses  its
earnings  to finance  current  consumption  and/or  to add to its wealth  stock.  The  household  derives
10utility directly  from current consumption and indirectly  from asset holdings. With money and
financial assets defined as future consumption options conditioned by transaction costs, the
household maximizes at each date of its time horizon a composite utility function based on the
utility delivered by current consumption, and the utility produced by asset holdings.
The household thus orders its preferences across consumption commodities and (money
and financial) assets according to a strictly quasi-concave,  time-separable utility function U:
R +4-  R + defined as U=U(C,L,B,A).  The household's plan at date t is thus to maximize:
(3)  UH=Max  ,  ES  3B[U(CELr  BrA)]  0 <  <  1, 9 = T-t
C,L,B,,  r=t
subject to the intertemporal constraint reported in Appendix I.:
(4)  pcCh  + z  < Yvh  +  E  r,  PO Q h
Q=B,A,
+  EQ  [dt max(0 P,  I~Qf,  -- PI 2Qh_2)-dF  ma-  (,  pQQQ  - pQ  Qh  )]
(5) C,L,B,A>0
(6)  limL,  = limB,  =limA,  = 0
r-*  T-.  r
with d Q > 0 if At; =  - (T - 1) = 1  > At  (suboptimal  sale) and where:
z,  is household saving and is defined as zh  = 14  - + E  (JQQ-  1);
Q
YN=  + g  -t  is disposable income;
E  rFI  P,Q  Qt7-I  is the interest income received from last period's Q-holdings;
Q
PoQ  is the purchase price of  Q; and
the two terms in d Q max(-)  represent, respectively,  the eventual gain/loss from buying/ selling
asset Q (=B,A) at a discount.
The solution to the household plan (see Appendix I) requires that at date t, for given current
and expected values of a, ,8, )r,  rB  and  r A,  the household selects for each date r 2 t an
allocation (CH*,  L$', BH",  A)  that satisfies the optimal intra-date rule
(7)  U,  (C?*)(PC)I  =  u (LI*)  = u  (B,*)(PB)l  =  uW(Ar*  ,P  I  w)(PA)'  =  A
11Rule (7) requires each household to equate at every instant the weighted marginal utilities
derived from allocating the marginal resource unit to the available consumption commodities and
assets (weighted with the inverse of their own current market price). For given expectations of
future shocks to consumption, rule (7) ensures that the costs of mobilizing resources to absorb
those shocks are minimized since the underlying optimization model incorporates the probability
of incurring such costs (relation (2)). At each date, prices in each market must be such that rule
(7) holds across all households under the following market clearing conditions:
(El)  E  Ch  = yo  =  E  yh
(E2)  Eh  Lh _L
(E3)  EhBh  =Bo
(E4)  E  Ah  = AO
From rule (7) it is immediately evident that a lowerT implies at the margin a lower utility
of the illiquid asset. Equilibrium allocation would then involve relatively smaller shares of asset A
in portfolios. Thus, rule (7) implies that:
Proposition 1. Ceteris paribus, in an economy with relatively lowerfinancial efficiency (i.e., a
lower T ) equilibrium current consumption and the equilibrium stocks of liquid assets in
individual  portfolios are larger than in an economy with a more efficient financial system.
Call T  -efficient (resp., T  -inefficient) the economy with high (low) financial efficiency.
The two economies are hypothetically equal in all other respects. As asset A represents a financial
claim on the economy's productive capital and its supply is interest-elastic (with positive but
finite elasticity), rule (7) and conditions E(l)-E(4) imply that:
Proposition 2.  The T  -inefficient economy has a smaller equilibrium capital endowment
than T  -efficient economy.'
In terms of relative price structure, rule (7) and conditions E(l)-E(4) also imply that:
12Proposition 3. In the '  -inefficient economy capital trades at a discount as compared to the
T  -efficient economy. The same equilibrium stock of capital is held in the two economies only if,
ceteris paribus, the return on capital in the T  -inefficient economy is enough to compensate
holders  for the relativefinancial  inefficiency.
Note however, that:
Proposition 4.  The increase in the rate of return required to induce holders of capital in the
T  -inefficient economy to catch up with the capital endowment of the T  -efficient economy is
not feasible under the existing technology.
The extent of the unfeasible region - defined by the demands for capital in the two
economies and the marginal efficiency of capital - represents the cost of the relative financial
inefficiency of the 'P -inefficient economy (see Appendix II). The above propositions have clear
implications for economic development policy, as they emphasize the importance of reforms to
enhance financial efficiency as a way to  support productive capital accumulation in emerging
economies.
1.2.3 Impact of uncertainty
Uncertainty is here assumed to affect the probability distribution functions used by the
agents to predict future supply innovations in the economy: a higher degree of uncertainty implies
a more spread out probability density function of future supply shocks and, therefore, a larger
output volatility (Appendix IV). This section takes the case of real output uncertainty, but the
methodology could as well apply to monetary uncertainty (Bossone, 1997). By way of a simple
analysis of the model's f.o.c.'s under the given assumptions, it is possible to assess the impact on
equilibrium allocation and prices of an increase in agents' perceived uncertainty over future
output shocks in an economy with incomplete trust. With utility functions featuring the properties
described earlier and assuming that the agents anticipate real supply shocks to affect their
consumption, one has that
(8)  E [u'(C  )] -'  [LE(C,)] >  O
13where the difference of the LHS increases with the expected variability of future consumption. To
take into account the riskpremium  associated with increasing consumption variability, function
OC can be introduced whereby
(9)  , E[u'  (C1)] = 0(,E(C 1), (o,  I  w )),  0c  <0,  4bi'J  >  0
Relation (2) can thus be rewritten as
(2b)  u' (Qth I  w,)
=  ,86 9{[1 -ddQ(o7-  I  wg, )]1S(,E(Qth  pc,p  Iw,),  IIRI)pr(sc  =S  wD)  pr(.)}
9~~~~~~~~~
= O(Qt, Pr-,, o,  RrQ,'  P I  w )
with derivatives
(10)  q'Q< 0 ,q'p>  0',,  R?,qY  R>,0,>0
where pr  =[tEp%  c=  and RrQ =[ E  l(Ri  ,)]'1 1 are the vectors of the expected values (as of date
e+i
t) of, respectively, commodity prices and compound gross real interest rates on assets. As discussed
earlier, the sign of O', depends on the behavior of both d Q and pr(.)  and thus, ultimately, on the
liquidity of the asset. Note, however, that O',r (L), si'  (B)  > 0 while O',  (A)  < 0.  Finally, an
increase in financial efficiency increases Q's marginal utility. It is assumed that this effect is
relatively stronger for private claims, such as equity, while it is negligible for government securities
which already trade at a low discount due to government guarantee (see above).
Using (2b) and positing w, = wo, rule (7) under (El)-(E4) can be written as
(7a)  (Ch*,pr,o`  I  w 0)(p7c - 1 =  *(L*+pCT  1 W  e  O)
=  5(Bh*,P7,a  B,R I WO)(P  B*I
0(AtSr,<,  R  p-  ']  A-  T  °)  Yt-
=  t
14Note that current consumption is conditional on w° when r > t.  From (7a), (2b) and (10),
and recalling that both(a,  I  w1)  and pr(sc  =  s'  I  w,) increase as w approaches one, it follows
that an increase in w1 to  w'  > w° affects equilibrium prices since
(11)  w(C,  wI)(p  I  )l2 =(L,  I  WI)  = S(B, -I  )
1  0
>=(A,  T  I>  w)(pA  )-l
Recalling the invariance of B's discount factor, the inequality in (I1) is due to the
differential impact of A's discount factor on A's marginal utility following the change in signal w.
Note that, in response to the signal, the other marginal utilities in (11) all increase by an equal
amount due to the expected increase in consumption variability. Clearly, at prices pC  , p B* and
pA*  , and with a given current inflation rate, the new aggregate demands for consumption and
assets are
(Dl) zh (C,  WI)>  Y0
(D2)  Xh  (L|  Wl  > L
(D3) Eh  (Bh |wI)  > B
(D4) Jh(Ah  |wI)  < A
At date t, re-attaining equilibrium (E1)-(E4) from (DI)-(D4) requires instantaneous prices
and inflation  to adjust  to the new levelspc  > pC*  pB*  >  p  B,  pA  <pjA  and  t' >  Z7.  The
new equilibrium prices reflect agents' revised expectations over future prices and interest rates,
based on new information. Note that instantaneous inflation needs to increase if the marginal
utility of the unremunerated L-holdings is to adjust consistently with rule (7a). Note also that, in
light of the inverse price/interest rate relationship, the new equilibrium asset prices imply that:
RtB* <RB* and R  A**  > RA*  .This shows:
15Proposition 5. An expected increase in output variability drives risk-averse agents to substitute
future with present consumption, and to shift their  portfolio composition towards more liquid
assets enabling them to absorb negative consumption shocks with minimum suboptimal asset
sales. For equilibrium to be re-established in all markets, the price of current consumption and
the required (equilibrium) real rates on less liquid assets have to rise, while the required
(equilibrium) real rates on liquid assets have to adjust downward.
Basically, the way uncertainty works its effects through the economy in this model is via its
expected impact on the timing of asset trading and its related transaction costs. In times of higher
perceived uncertainty, agents expect discounts on less liquid assets to increase when they
suddenly want to make their portfolio more liquid.
In fact, there is no guarantee that the new equilibrium prices will be attained or sustainable,
if attained. Risk perceptions might be such as to lead the agents to deny their money to new
supply of less liquid liabilities at whatever price they are offered. Such a disequilibrium outcome
is consistent with financial market rationing phenomena typical of AI models of credit and capital
markets.
Finally, relations (11), (DI)-(D4) and the propositions above imply that:
Proposition 6. Improving the efficiency of the  financial system helps the economy's relative
prices better absorb exogenous shocks  and
Proposition 7. Ceteris paribus, higher  financial efficiency lowers the equilibrium relative price of
capital and the required  premium on "catch-up " investment (see Proposition 4).
The last proposition suggests that, especially in the context of emerging economies, there is
a complementarity between financial and real sector development that can be exploited through
appropriate policies, a point which today is supported by considerable empirical evidence" 9
16Part II. A policy view
11.1 Enhancing trust
Information limitation and asymmetries are a fact of life and agents may have strong
incentives to exploit them unethically. Also, information and its use are costly and not all agents
can afford them. Moreover, specialization of human activities is such that a world with symmetric
information is not attainable, nor would it be economically efficient (which is not to deny,
however, that at least in principle more information is always better than less). Indeed, a market
economy is essentially based on the need of each individual in society to rely on the specialized
knowledge of others as an efficient way to increase her welfare.
What matters, then, is that agents be able to rely on each other, and to have means to select
counterparties they can trust with using private information efficiently and fairly. As shown in
part I, the trust issue is crucial in financial transactions whereby anonymous agents trade
promises. Finance can thus be seen as the complex of institutions, instruments, norms and
infrastructure aimed to reduce transaction costs associated with trading promises between agents
who do not trust each other fully. In this respect, financial intermediaries act as bridges of trust
between agents, and their efficiency can be measured by their ability to reduce the costs involved
in bridging trust gaps (consistently with the definition of financial efficiency offered in part 1).
The public sector can enhance trust in finance by improving the enforcement technologies
embodied in financial infrastructure (e.g., legal system, financial regulation, security in payment
and trading systems). But although strengthening enforcement technologies is necessary, it cannot
be the only solution since enforcing obligations becomes extremely costly if obligations run
contrary to private incentives. Fundamental improvements in financial efficiency can thus be
gained by eliciting good conduct as much as possible through market forces" 0
11.2 Trust and reputational capital
As noted, in a world with incomplete trust, agents can earn positive quasi-rents by
specializing in financial intermediation between anonymous traders unwilling to trade promises
directly. In terms of part I model, intermediation by good bridges of trust reduces transaction
costs on the trading of promises and attracts demand for promises that would otherwise be
prohibitively expensive. In a competitive environment where agents seek to discriminate between
17good and bad bridges of trust, it pays intermediaries to earn a good reputation and to signal such
reputation to the market. Where agents reward trust for honest and prudent behavior and punish
untrustworthy behavior, reputation links the intermediaries' stream of future profits to their past
business conduct. Good intermediaries thus accumulate reputational capital which conveys to the
market the value of their commitment not to breach their (implicit or explicit) contracts with
clients and counterparties.Y
Operationally, the reputational capital of a financial intermediary consists of a complex of
variables that signal the intermediary's commitment and capacity to fulfil its obligations. The
most relevant variables are: the intermediary's long-term mission, its market presence and past
performance, financial strength and profitability, organizational and governance structure,
capacity to manage financial and operational risks, track record of compliance with legal and
financial obligations, quality of service and advice delivered, quality of projects financed, quality
and ethics of management and personnel, and transparency of operations, resources invested to
stay in business. Other variables, external to the individual intermediaries, bear on their
reputational capital and include the quality of financial regulation and supervision and the
strength of law enforcement to which they are subject.
Klein and Leffler (1996) study the conditions under which the franchise of firms supplying
high quality of products exceeds their one-time wealth increase from distrustful behavior (i.e.,
selling to customers a quality less than contracted for). They show, inter alia, three important
results: First, they determine the price premium (above the competitive price) at which the value
of satisfied customers exceeds the return to the firm from cheating, thus motivating competitive
firms to honor high quality promises. This quality-assuring premium provides the supplying firm
with a perpetual stream of quasi-rents whose present value is greater than the profit from
cheating, that is: the net franchise value of the firm is positive, this being the value at loss if
misbehavior puts the intermediary out of business net of the one-time gain obtainable from
misbehaving. 22
Second, firms accumulate non-salvageable (productive and/or nonproductive) capital assets
through which they signal to customers their commitment not to cheat. Such assets are part of the
firms' reputational capital and represents the collateral that firms stand to lose if they supply less
than the anticipated quality (bank capital and reserves are an example). As the reputational capital
saves on the costs to evaluate trustworthiness, it gives the agents an incentive to pay a premium to
the firms for receiving the desired quality. In the case where the supplying firm is a financial
intermediary, such a premium reflects the value to the agents from minimizing the cost of trading
promises under incomplete trust: 23 investors accept to pay a trust-assuring premium for being able
to entrust the intermediary agents with managing informational asymmetries vis-a-vis fund-
18takers.  24 In fact, the intermediaries may extract extra-rents from fund-takers, too, in the form of
higher than competitive prices, as they enable them to economize on their reputational investment
in non-salvageable assets. This is consistent with the evidence reported by Rajan and Zingales
(1999) indicating that firms operating in more developed financial sectors undertake less fixed
capital formation. 25
Third, as prices below the quality-assuring level decrease the demand for high quality
output, Klein and Leffler show that, under free market entry, firms compete on non-price terms
and seek to win customers by signaling a higher reputational capital. Under their model, it can be
shown that reputational capital accumulates (and new entries occur) within the industry to the
point where the business net franchise value is competed away.
Abstracting from ethical considerations (which, of course, influence the incentive structure
of individual intermediaries), what precedes suggests that investing in reputational capital is
meaningful only in repeated-game contexts with long business time horizons 6 Repeated and
extended dealings must take place over a period long enough to ensure that the net franchise
value is positive.27  Designing incentives to promote investment in reputational capital in the
financial sector requires to consider these features.
11.3 Incentives
The discussion in this section centers on incentives to induce trustworthy behavior in the
financial sector by soliciting agents' self-interest in ways that generate self-sustaining
enforcement mechanisms of good behavior. Areas of public policy to strengthen financial
infrastructure are not dealt with here, although - as noted - their omission should not be
understood as neglecting their importance.
11.3.1  Investing in reputational capital: the role of regulation
Increasing the franchise of financial institutions is a necessary first step of financial sector
reform. Only a positive net franchise value from intermediation may attract investment in
reputational capital from financial institutions. Use of mild regulatory  restraints on market
competition might increase the franchise value of domestic institutions, especially in least
developed countries and in those emerging from long periods of financial repression, or in deep
financial crisis and restructuring their financial sector (see Hellmann and Murdock 1995, and
Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz 1994, 1995, 1996).
In the banking sector, restraints such as (market-based) deposit rate ceilings and
restrictions on market entry may have large rent creation effects that would allow banks to raise
19profits during the initial phase of reform. Hellmann et al., cit., show that the degree of restraints
necessary to produce significant rents is such that would not generate large financial market price
distortions. Also, to the extent that banks respond positively to restraints by investing rents in
reputational capital, price distortions would be partly eliminated by lower risk. In terms of Klein
and Leffler's framework, restraints correspond to determining the trust-assuring price premium
exogenously while preventing free market entry. As a result, accumulation of reputational capital
is not induced by competition and must therefore be forced by regulation (see below).
Restraints should be accompanied, and eventually replaced, by restrictions on market
entry/exit based on reputational capital criteria. With exogenous reputational capital and
competitive or contestable markets, trust-assuring price premiums become endogenous and
restraints are no longer desirable. Reputational capital criteria could include minimum
requirements on financial capital, organizational, operational, and governance structures, risk-
management capacity, and conditions for fit and proper owners and managers. Licensing should
imply serious initial commitments from owners and managers wishing to enter the market,
showing their strong commitment to forsake one-time rent options from cheating or from
behaving imprudently. Issue of subordinated uninsured debt (see 11.3.5)  and publicly observable
discretionary guarantees (Boot et al., 1993) could also be required by regulation as signaling
devices for reputational capital and its dynamics.
Where restraints apply, reputational capital criteria could be used by regulators to make
markets contestable: licenses could be granted (transferred) to owners and managers on the basis
of their plans for a strong reputational capital. Transparent reputational capital criteria could be
used by regulators to decide on approval of changes in ownership and management resulting from
market takeovers, mergers, and reorganizations.
11.3.3  Investing in reputational capital: the role of  economic capital
Economic  capital  is a core component  of the  reputational  capital  of financial
intermediaries. The capital adequacy  ratios of the Basle Accord are a first essential step to induce
banks to accumulate capital vis-a-vis risks. As is well known, however, the static approach
embodied in the Accord may cause inefficiencies in resource allocation (Nickerson, 1995), and
result in either inadequate economic capital or undue costs on banks. Moreover, if  capital ratios
are perceived exclusively as regulatory requirements, compliance with them could induce to self-
complacency from the intermediaries and to misleading signals to investors.
As the financial system develops in emerging economies, banks in these countries should
be advised to replace static capital ratios with more dynamic (and tailor-made) methods that
correlate financial capital more closely to risks. This would render the effects of risk
20diversification more visible and measurable, and strengthen the incentives to portfolio
diversification. More in general, it would make clearer to banks the trade-off between the cost of
raising extra capital funds and the marginal reputational gain associated with additional financial
capital and would thus induce banks to internalize decisions on capital ratios.
As more dynamic risk-management systems are introduced, regulation should: 1) require
banks to disclose their market and credit risk position; 2) require banks to raise capital if  this is
less than the reported risks; 3) prevent banks from underestimating their potential losses by
requiring them to put up extra capital if actual losses exceed the ex-ante estimations (i.e., restore
their capital or maintain higher ratios as a penalty) S Ultimately, regulators would be less
concerned with determining capital ratios and specialize in assessing the methodologies used by
banks to determine their own ratios.
11.3.3 Investing  in reputational  capital: the role of self-regulation
To the extent that the franchise of intermediaries interacting in financial markets can be
very sensitive to their mutual behavior, they have an incentive to undertake self-policing activities
through which they can monitor each other, elicit voluntary good conduct, and sanction
misbehavior. 29 Increases in franchise value and incentives to build reputational capital may result
from the interest that private-sector agents take in establishing long-term mutual bonds to enforce
honest and prudent behavior through self-policing.
Self-policing arrangements may develop within financial communities (Goodhart, 1988)3°
In some cases, they evolve into fully fledged self-regulatory organizations (SROs) with internal
statutory rules (regarding admission and sanctions), financial resources, and formal structures
involving shareholders, managers and employees, codes of conduct, and oversight procedures
involving rules of conduct and information disclosure (Glaessner, 1993). Many countries today
adopt SROs in payments and securities markets. SROs may range from interbank deposit
markets, to wholesale and retail payment systems, securities trading and stock exchanges,
securities lending and settlement clearinghouse services, deposit insurance, and credit information
sharing systems.
Incentives in financial SROs - especially in interbank payment and settlement systems - can
be strengthened by members agreeing to pre-committing resources - in the form of mutual
lending obligations or collateral pooling -that would be mobilized if one or more members run
into illiquidity or insolvency problems. Pre-commitments to liquidity- and loss-sharing
arrangements generate incentives for each member to monitor the others, agree on and enforce
rules, and sanction misbehavior. Liquidity and loss-sharing arrangements protect market
participants from the systemic consequences of failures of one or more financial institutions.
21They thus afford supervisors some higher degrees of freedom in deciding whether to let insolvent
institutions fail, and enhance the certainty of government exit policies. To the extent that greater
certainty lessens agent expectations of government bailouts or forbearance, investors are faced
with stronger incentives to good conduct and careful monitoring.
Some problems may complicate the setting up of financial SROs in developing countries.
Scarcity of institutional resources may constrain the quality of oversight, and the lack of
reasonably homogenous institutions could impede the formation of internally balanced structures.
Also, SROs might transform themselves into cartels and jeopardize competition. Even so,
because of their specialized  knowledge and self-interest, SROs are better placed than government
bureaucracies to design rules consistent with the features of their business, to keep their
operational institutional process apace with progress, and to improve their business standards.
Also, as inforrnation is vital to each SRO member, the SRO setting is better positioned than
government agencies to achieve enforcement of disclosure rules through peer monitoring.
Government has a key role to play in supporting the formation of financial community ties
along sound self-regulatory principles. It could delegate to domestic financial institutions the task
to form industry groups for governing and running specialized markets. Government should
monitor SRO operations and intervene if their action deviates from purposes. Government should
also ensure that SRO rules and practices are compatible with fair market competition.
Finally, the efficiency of dispute resolutions and adjudication processes is crucial for the
success of SROs. 3' Government should not preclude (indeed, it should encourage) private judicial
mechanisms and institutions that serve to enforce good conduct. In a number of cases, out-of-
court procedures have been successfully employed to govern corporate restructuring processes
(Claessens, 1998).
11.3.4 Signaling reputational capital: the role of information
In a competitive environment, good-quality information on financial intermediaries can
stimulate investment in reputational capital as it increases the franchise of intermnediaries  who
achieve higher reputational standards. In the trust-related context developed above, information is
the vehicle that conveys to the market knowledge about the reputational capital of individual
intermediaries. A critical component of financial sector reform is thus the improvement of the
information generation and dissemination process. The government can help a private market for
information to develop.
Provided that financial institutions invest in reputational capital and investors optimize
their risk/return combinations, there are incentives for information to be searched and supplied by
specialized agents. 32 On the demand side, sensitivity to capital losses motivates investors to use
22information to select well-reputed financial intermediaries. Govermnent should exploit this
sensitivity to design market devices for raising information demand (see section 11.3.4).  For
example, where there is a subordinated debt requirement for banks, healthy banks have an
incentive to reveal their true reputational capital status so that subordinated-debt holders facing
aggregate shocks, and otherwise unable to discriminate good from bad banks, do not
indiscriminately sell their holdings.
Market demand for information, in turn, prompts intermediaries seeking to enhance their
reputation to provide reliable information. Increasing extended dealings may strengthen this
incentive, as intermediaries with large reputational capital seeks to exploit extended dealings by
disclosing more information to their clientele (Hellmann et'al., 1995). One way of doing this is by
allowing intermediaries to operate across a broad range of market and maturity segments, since
reputational capital in one segment affects their franchise in the others. This increases the
franchise of well-reputed intermediaries and give them an incentive to act prudently and honestly
in the new segments.
The demand and supply factors for information induce agents to specialize in information
provision. Examples are credit bureaus, rating agencies, and securities underwriters. Credit
bureaus, for instance, improves the signal from borrowers' reputational capital and increases
lending volumes to safe borrowers that would otherwise be priced out of the market due to
adverse selection (Jappelli and Pagano, 1991). Matching or referral services - such as the well-
known accreditation schemes in the US health sector - could be provided by private agents to
inform clients about quality, terms, and conditions of services from individual intermediaries.
Financial referral services could rely on information disseminated by agencies or on information
made available by the intermediaries themselves, as well as on clients' evaluations, opinions and
satisfaction rating reports. Referral services would supply a channel for intermediaries to
advertise their reputational capital to potential clients on the basis of tested and verifiable
information."
Providers of customized information might operate for a profit and sell specialized reports.
If information is proprietary, its production can be profitable. Providers of uniform information
might otherwise organize themselves as consumer unions or producer cooperatives and be
remunerated by their respective communities (Klein, 1997). In the case of credit bureaus,
increasing returns associated with additional participating banks tend to make the systems operate
as natural monopolies (Jappelli and Pagano, cit.); in this case, they might organize themselves as
SROs.
Government can support information provision in direct ways. It could subsidize one or a
few private enterprises until a market takes off. Through SROs, government could induce private-
23sector  financial  intermediaries  to set up information  services  for their mutual  benefit and for
clients.  Government  could  initially  provide  information  services  directly,  as in the case  of the
Central  de Deudores  in Argentina,  and later let the private  sector  take over (Calomiris,  1997;
World  Bank, 1998).  Government  could  also  provide  infrastructure  that would  ease the flow  of
private  information.  It could  disseminate  information  on  bank credit risk collected  in its banking
supervisory  capacity  and establish  a centralized  registry  for collateral. 34
11.3.5  Signaling reputational capital: the role of private risk-takers
As noted,  sensitivity  to capital  losses  motivates  investors  to use information  to select  well-
reputed  financial  intermediaries.  In the banking  sector,  deposit  insurance  schemes  could  be
designed  so as to induce  much  closer  attention  from (both  large and small)  depositors  on the true
status of their banks. 35 This would  be achieved,  for instance,  if insurance  premiums  were
correlated  with bank risks  and made  known  to depositors,  since  a higher  premium  would  indicate
a lower  reputational  capital.  Such an incentive  would  be further  strengthened  if the insurance  was
provided  by competing  private insurers,  as these  would  seek to correlate  premiums  with  risks as
closely  as possible  and thus generate  a strong demand  for good-quality  information  from banks.
Similarly,  limited  insurance  coverage  would  likely  induce  depositors  to assess  more  carefully
their banks.  Another  strong  incentive  would  hold if depositors  were asked  to co-pay  insurance
premniums  correlated  with bank  risks, and if premiums  were to vary with the extent of insurance
coverage  purchased.
Another  market-based  signaling  device  for  reputational  capital  would  be provided  by
requiring  intermediaries  to finance  a small  portion  of their non-reserve  assets  with subordinated
debt (uninsured  certificates  of deposits)  bearing  an interest  rate  not greater than  the riskless  rate
plus a given spread  and held  by well-informed  market agents  (Keehn,  1989;  Wall, 1989;
Calomiris,  1997).  Subordinate-debt  holders  would  have an incentive  to monitor  debtors'
compliance  with the risk-cap  requirement  and to sell at discount  the debt  of under-performing
institutions.  This device  would supply  the  market  with reliable  signals  on the intermediaries'
reputational  capital,  provided  there  was a liquid  secondary  market  for the subordinated  debt  and
that the debt-issue  requirement  was credible  and effective  in the first place3 6
24Appendix I
Solution to household plan (3}-(6)
Maximand (3) expresses two trade-off (utility) relations: the first is between current
consumption and options to future consumption; the second is between the store-of-value
enhancing capacity and the liquidity of the future consumption options held in the  portfolio. To
solve plan (3)-(6), Bellman's equation can be written as
(A  l )  V (LrIn  B  1,  A"  Rv  YNr-,[P]?rI)  = Maia  {U(Ch,er,Br  ,Ar)
C,L,B,A
+ ,#V(Lh+,,  B'+  , A"+  , Rw+l ,Y,,+l  [P]  rl)}
where:
[P] is the price vector of consumption-commodity and assets;
( r-  IR1 1 v  ,-,[P],- 1 )  is the state of the economy at date  r;  and
R w is the real rate of return on the household's portfolio.
The Euler equation for (Cr',  Lr, B,",Ar)-[Or] iS thus
(A2)  U  (C,,  e,,  Br,  )=,U(+l,  A,I  l, Br,A+  (  r+l
Condition (A2) establishes the optimal intertemporal path for consumption and asset
holdings. But what is of interest to us is the intra-date composition of vector [Oh],  that is, the
household's intra-date allocation of resources to current consumption and individual assets. The
problem can be framed as in plan (3)-(6) in the text, here reported for convenience:
(3)  U  = Max tEZ  flsU(C',Lr,  B, , ABh  )  s.t.
C,L,B,A  r
(4)  pfC'  + Z  <  yh  +  ErQ  PQ
P,rt  -Vt  t  - t-l
Q=B,A,
+ EQ[d  max(O, Pt  1 Qh  -Pt  Qr2 )  - d  max(O, Pt 2QF  2 -Q P  Qh_r)]
(5) C,L,B,A>O
(6) lim Lr = lim Br = lim A, = °
Applying Lagrange method to plan (3)-(6) and using equation (2)
u' (Q)  = u' (Q,  I W,)2
25= Zf8{( 1-d")  ,E[u'(Q, /pc)HeR2]pr(s'  =sc  w,)/  pr(,)j
yield the following first order conditions:
fV,(Crh)  =  p  (PrC) 8  (Cr  ) _r  °
tV  L)  =  =/30u'(L)  -AT  0
tV'(Bh)  = 8,1(B(p)1u,  (Br  )  -,r  r  =0
0V'(Ah)=,8'9(pA)-'u'(AhT  wt)  o
PU{PC  Ct  +Zt  YN±2  rt  QPOQ  QQ-
Q=B,A,
Q [d  Q  max(0,  PQI  Qr  - PI- Qr  2  )-  d  max(O, PI  QT  2 Pj-  Q  1 )Q1}  =  0
implying that at planning date t, for given current and expected values of or, ,B,  ',  r  B  and  r A,
the household selects the allocation [o]*  ((CH  L*,  B",  A,*)  which at each date r satisfies
the optimal intra-date rule
(7)  U  (Cr )(pC)'  = Ut(Lr ) = u'(Br  )(PB)- 1 = H  (Ar ,uP  l w  )(PA)l  =
Thus, with given commodity and asset prices, rule (7) determines optimal individual
demands for C, L, B and A, at every date and requires each household to equate at every instant
the weighted marginal utilities derived from allocating the marginal resource unit to consumption
commodity and assets (weighted with the inverse of their own current market price). Consistency
of rule (7) with the solution to the household's dynamic problem can be seen to hold by showing
that no allocation [oh  ] exists which solves condition (A2) while violating rule (7): with rule (7)
violated, an allocation [oh**  >  [loh* ] consistent with (7) can always be attained within the given
constraints, that yields a higher value for (3) at no extra cost to the household and solves (A2).
Appendix  II
The cost of (relative) financial inefficiency
The meaning of Proposition 4 can be seen more clearly in Figure 1, whereD,  and D2 are
the demand schedules for capital K as a function of interest rate r in theT -inefficient and  P -
efficient economy, respectively, and schedule k(K) is the marginal return on capital as a function
of capital stock. (As before, claims on K are represented by holdings of asset A in household
portfolios).D 1 lies entirely aboveD2 since, ceteris paribus,  asset holders in the T  -inefficient
economy require a premium  (r+ - r ) on the rate of return for holding the same stock of capital
as in T  -efficient economy. The equilibrium stock in the former (K-) is therefore lower than in
the latter (K  ) and achieving K*  requires an increase in the rate of return along D, above the
feasible region delimited by k. The unfeasible region defined by r-r+K-K* represents the
relative cost of the T  -inefficiency.
26r,k
Di
r  -- -
r






Asset realization and price discount
As the date  of asset realization  falls  closer  to planning  date t, the risk of suboptimal  sale
increases.  There  is thus a link  between  the  probability  of date-event  s,,  the proximity  of T to t,
and the size  of d Q.  To show  this, consider  two extreme  cases by solving  eq. (2) for some  critical
values  of  dQ and  pr(), assuming  Q has maturity  T, dQ*  = 0, rQ is constant,  and UT  = 0.
Case  1): if at time 0: pr(sc  = s')  = 0, T = 0, T - 1, that is, no shock  to consumption  is
anticipated during the life of the asset (which is equivalent to the case where pr(sC  = SF) =  1),
and the agent  is certain  that she  will not have  to liquidate  Q at a discount  ( dQ  =0),  the current
marginal utility of Q is u' (QO)  =  f8T  O  E[u' (POQQ 0 / pT )RQ']
Case 2): If at time 0: pr[(sc = s'),  T: r / At;  -e  0]  =  1,  that is, a shock  to consumption  is
anticipated  for date  T,  and r is such  that the agent  will have  to sell the asset suboptimally,  then
d2 -I  and u'(Q) -0.
These  examples  represent  benchmarks  for more  realistic  cases. For,  at times of higher
variability  of, say, real inconie,  asset  price  discounts  are likely  to increase  to the extent  that the
subjective  probability  of having  to realize  illiquid  assets  suboptimally  at each  date is higher.  In
such cases,  the current  marginal  utility  of the assets  involved  would  decrease.
27Appendix  IV
News, signals, and uncertainty
This approach generalizes the one adopted by Giovannini (1989) to model anticipated
shocks. Use x, to indicate the vector of stochastically-independent real output shocks to the
economy. At each date, the agents observe the realization of x and try to anticipate future shocks
by using (i.i.d.)  current information w' e  .The agents operate a transformation T of w' such that
T: w'  T E (Qi  ® R) -*  w E [0,1], which associates to every single bit of information w' a real
number ("signal" w) in the interval [0,1]. In every period the evolution of variable y is governed
by the following (conditional) probability distribution function:
(Al)  pr(x,  | w,  ) = En,  Wnprn(xr)
Where  the  w,, 's are generated  by the function  W: w, E [0,1]  - (wnt  ER')  and satisfy:
1)  0 < W_, < 1_  liWit  = 1
2) limmax(wn,)  = 0  and  lim max(wn,)  =  1;Vt,n  EN
The w,n,  's provide  a weight  structure  that is specific  to the signal  received  at each  point  in time.
The  greater  the uncertainty  perceived  by the agent,  the lower  the value of highest  weight
attributable  to the probability  of any given  shock.  The structure  of weights  associated  to every
signal  by function  W determines  a probability  distribution  for each shock  x. Such  distribution  is
drawn  from  a set of distribution  functions  prn  (-) 's obeying  the following  restrictions:
i)  E(x,pr(x  j w,)) = E(xr ), Vw, that is, all distributions  are mean-preserving;
ii) Prk  (XT  I  w,) - prj (xr I  w,) = MPS(x )  V  k, j,  that is, the distribution spreads are mean-
preserving (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970)
iii) lim[pr(x,  I w,) - pr(E(x) I  wJ  = 0, that is, the probability  density  function  of any given
shock  x, becomes more spread out as the signal approaches one.
The rationale for this formal structure is that for any given signal received, the agent forms
a specific conjecture as to the possible occurrence of a future supply innovations. The structure of
weights assumed represents the degree of belief (or confidence) that the agent attaches to such
conjectures. The value of each received signal w reflects the degree of uncertainty perceived by
the agents: as w increases, the weights change so as to make any conjecture on future shocks
weaker and, thus, any prediction more tenuous.
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